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The Common Cause Principle in 
Historical Linguistics* 
Christopher Hitchcocktt 
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology 
Despite the platitude that analytic philosophy is deeply concerned with language, phi- 
losophers of science have paid little attention to methodological issues that arise within 
historical linguistics. I broach this topic by arguing that many inferences in historical 
linguistics conform to Reichenbach's common cause principle (CCP). Although the 
scope of CCP is narrower than many have thought, inferences about the genealogies 
of languages are particularly apt for reconstruction using CCP. Quantitative ap- 
proaches to language comparison are readily understood as methods for detecting the 
correlations that serve as premises for common cause inferences, and potential sources 
of error in historical linguistics correspond to well-known limitations of CCP. 
1. Introduction. In a high school philosophy class, one of my fellow 
students asked the teacher why all of the philosophers we were studying 
were long dead. Why no twentieth-century philosophers? The teacher, 
always an opinionated man, replied that twentieth-century philosophy 
was obsessed with language, rather than with the world that it repre- 
sents. To him, this was like looking out at the world through a window, 
and examining in minute detail the cracks and scratches on the window 
pane. Like all caricatures, this is an exaggeration that contains a grain 
of truth. Philosophy of language is an area of study that has blossomed 
in the twentieth century, and occupies a central place in contemporary 
analytic philosophy. Many philosophers themselves know a good deal 
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about linguistic theory, particularly in the areas of syntax, semantics, 
and pragmatics. Indeed, semantics and pragmatics would rightly be 
said to belong to the intersection of philosophy and linguistics. 
In recent philosophy of science, there has been a growing interest in 
the methodology of genealogical inference. This has been sparked, in 
no small measure, by the work of Elliott Sober. His book Reconstruct- 
ing the Past (Sober 1988), for which he won the prestigious Lakatos 
prize, brought to philosophers' attention the methodological debates 
within systematics, that part of biology that deals with the classification 
of species into higher taxa. 
Given these two interests, it is surprising that there has been little 
philosophical interest in the problems attending the reconstruction of 
linguistic family trees-the provenance of historical linguistics. This is 
a field that has seen its share of controversy, often over methodological 
issues that should attract the interest of philosophers. It is a primary 
goal of this paper to draw philosophers' attention to some of these 
issues. I will argue that an important type of inference in historical 
linguistics conforms to the Common Cause Principle (hereafter CCP) 
familiar to philosophers. In Section 21 introduce CCP, and make some 
observations upon a standard illustration. This is followed by an ac- 
count of inferences in historical linguistics, which are contrasted with 
seemingly similar inferences in evolutionary biology. I will argue that 
the former conform to CCP in a manner that the latter do not. In 
Sections 4 and 5 I discuss a proposal for implementing common cause 
inferences in historical linguistics, and argue that limitations to the 
CCP that have been discussed in the abstract by philosophers corre- 
spond to textbook caveats regarding inference in historical linguistics. 
I conclude by pointing to some outstanding problems. 
2. The Common Cause Principle. Since its original presentation in Rei- 
chenbach's Direction of Time (Reichenbach 1956), CCP has been given 
many different formulations, to various aims. Sometimes it is presented 
primarily as a thesis about statistical relationships, sometimes as a the- 
sis about causation, or about explanation, or about temporal asym- 
metry. I will not try to disentangle from this mess the 'true' common 
cause principle: I will simply provide a formulation that is germane to 
the current project. 
Suppose that A and B are event types that are positively correlated, 
i.e., such that if AB represents the joint occurrence of events of type A 
and B, then P(AB) > P(A)P(B). According to CCP, if A is not a 
cause of B nor vice versa, it is reasonable to postulate a common cause 
C of A and B, which explains the correlation. Reichenbach added the 
requirement that the common cause C screen off A and B, i.e., that 
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P(ABIC) = P(AI C)P(BIC). This is a standard requirement (although 
see Salmon 1984, Ch. 6, for a dissenting view). This further requirement 
will have little bearing on what follows. I will not assume that CCP is 
a universally valid form of inference, nor that it is a universally correct 
generalization about the relationship between causation and probabi- 
listic correlation. There is strong reason to think that CCP fails in the 
realm of microphysics, at least. I assume only that there is a range of 
cases in which inferences conforming to the CCP schema are reason- 
able ones. (For further discussion of some of the difficulties with CCP, 
see Sober 1988, Ch. 3, and Arntzenius 1993. We will return briefly to 
this issue in Section 6 below.) 
Here is an (embellished version of an) illustration of CCP provided 
by Reichenbach (1956, 157). Suppose that a traveling theater troupe is 
on tour for one thousand days. On ten of those days, one of the male 
actors, call him the 'leading man', suffered severe gastric distress. Like- 
wise, on ten days, one of the actresses-the leading lady-was similarly 
indisposed. On nine days, both the leading man and the leading lady 
had stomach illnesses. Assume that these frequencies reliably indicate 
underlying probabilities, and let A represent the leading man's being 
sick on a particular night, B the leading lady's being sick, and AB both 
being sick. Then P(A) = P(B) = .01, and P(AB) = .009, so A and 
B are probabilistically correlated. It would be reasonable, according to 
the common cause principle, to postulate a common cause, such as 
shared meals containing tainted food, to explain this correlation. This 
common cause occurs on some nights, but not on others; on those 
nights it does occur, it dramatically increases the probability that each 
actor will become sick. The occasional occurrence of this common 
cause explains the excess of nights on which both are sick, compared 
to what would be expected by chance. 
I wish to make a number of observations upon this example. 
(i) Although we assumed that the frequencies reliably indicate prob- 
abilities in this example, it is correlations among the probabilities them- 
selves, not the frequencies, that bespeak common causes. In practice, 
correlations among probabilities are not simply observed, but must be 
inferred, typically on the basis of observed frequencies. Sometimes 
these inferences are warranted, sometimes not. Mere correlations 
among frequencies-call these statistical correlations, in contrast to 
probabilistic correlations-do not necessarily warrant the postulation 
of common causes. Indeed, we would expect any sufficiently rich set of 
data to contain some statistical correlations, no matter how the data 
were generated. Obviously not all such statistical correlations demand 
common cause explanations. 
(ii) In this example, CCP warrants us in postulating a certain expla- 
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nation of the probabilistic correlation between two types of event. This 
correlation is explained by a type of event that occurs with some non- 
extreme probability. If the leading man and leading lady shared tainted 
food every night, and this common cause screened off the leading man's 
being sick from the leading lady's being sick, then there would have 
been no probabilistic correlation between these two event types. In this 
case, the event type that is postulated as the common cause-shared 
meals with tainted food-is instantiated within a sequence of instan- 
tiations of a broader event type: shared meals generally. That is, it is 
because the leading man and leading lady share meals in general that 
they occasionally share meals containing tainted food. 
CCP is sometimes taken as a principle for postulating explanations 
of particular joint occurrences. For example, if both the leading lady 
and the leading man became ill on a particular night, it might be rea- 
sonable to postulate a particular common cause of both illnesses. In 
general, however, this type inference to a particular common cause is 
only partially warranted by CCP as illustrated in this example. Sup- 
pose, to change the example somewhat, that each actor had been sick 
on 500 nights, and that both had been sick on 290 nights. Assuming 
that these frequencies are representative of the underlying probabilities, 
this constitutes a probabilistic correlation. This correlation is consistent 
with the following hypothesis: the leading man and leading lady share 
meals, and on 500 of their 1000 nights on the road, their meals were 
tainted. Each has a .7 probability of being sick when they eat tainted 
food, and a .3 probability when they do not. Assuming independence 
conditional upon eating tainted food and not, we would expect them 
both to be sick on 245 (i.e., 500(.7)(.7)) of the nights when they eat 
tainted food, and on 45 (i.e., 500(.3)(.3)) of the nights when they do 
not. Thus even if the hypothesis postulated in explanation of the cor- 
relation is true, and even if the leading man and leading lady are both 
sick on a given night, there is still a reasonable chance (about .16) that 
they did not eat tainted food on that night. 
(iii) It is not essential to the example that the tainted food have the 
same effect in both the leading man and the leading lady. Suppose that 
instead of suffering from gastric distress, the leading man had passed 
out on the days in question. The correlation between the leading lady's 
stomach illness and the leading man's passing out would still warrant 
a common cause explanation (assuming that it is a genuine probabilis- 
tic correlation and not merely a statistical correlation resulting from 
sampling error). It is thus important to distinguish between correlation 
and resemblance. There is an intuitive sense in which the two effects- 
the two actors' being sick-resemble one another, but this is not what 
the common cause inference is based upon. Two resembling, but un- 
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correlated events do not warrant a common cause explanation; two 
correlated, dissimilar events do. Indeed, Thagard (1988, 162-168) ar- 
gues that inferring causal connections on the basis of resemblance, 
rather than correlation, is a symptom of pseudoscience. 
(iv) Because of the frequencies cited in the example, the probabilistic 
inequality required by CCP is rendered meaningful. This is not a deep 
point about the metaphysics and epistemology of probability. I mean 
only that the frequencies provide some grounds for assigning the prob- 
ability values in question, and give us some conceptual grip on what 
those probabilities are. This is especially true for the joint probability 
P(AB). We are able to assign a value to this joint probability, inde- 
pendently of the probabilities of A and B taken individually, because 
it is possible to pair off instances of event types A and B and thus take 
frequencies of joint occurrences. That is, because we can pair individual 
episodes of illness in the leading man with episodes of illness in the 
leading lady (we pair them if they occur on the same day) we can use 
frequencies to estimate the probability of the event type AB. 
By contrast, suppose that the director of a rival theater builds two 
robots to take on the leading roles in her productions (perhaps hoping 
to avoid the need for cancellations due to stomach illness). On the first 
night, the robots break down and cannot perform. Abandoning her 
idea, the director destroys the robots and never builds another. Does 
the fact that the robots broke down on the same night constitute a 
correlation calling for a common cause explanation? That depends 
upon what the probabilities were. Here, we cannot reliably infer from 
frequency data the probability that each robot would break down on 
any given night. We may be able to come up with an a priori estimate, 
say on the basis of engineering considerations. This will not enable us 
to estimate a probability for their both breaking down, however, unless 
we build assumptions about dependence or independence into our es- 
timate (and thus beg the question). 
Philosophical errors have resulted from failure to heed these obser- 
vations. Consider, for example, Salmon's reconstruction of Perrin's ar- 
gument for the reality of molecules (Salmon 1984, 213-227). Perrin 
recounts numerous experiments to determine Avogadro's number, the 
number of molecules in one mole of a substance. The experiments in- 
volved very different phenomena, such as Brownian motion, X-ray 
diffraction, and black body radiation. These experiments all yielded 
results on the order of 6 x 1023. According to Salmon, this agreement 
between methods of computing Avogadro's number constitutes a strik- 
ing correlation, to be explained in terms of a common cause: the actual 
presence of a fixed number of molecules in a mole. This, however, is 
not a correlation in the probabilistic sense. In particular, the description 
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just given is consistent with each experiment being performed just once, 
in which case we have no basis for inferring any probabilistic correla- 
tions whatsoever. Consider for example, just two types of experiment, 
one involving alpha decay, the other involving black body radiation. 
Let A represent an experiment of the first type's yielding a result be- 
tween 5 and 7 x 1023, and B represent an experiment of the second 
type's yielding a result in the same range. If each type of experiment is 
performed just once, each yielding results in the specified range, that 
is entirely consistent with P(A) = P(B) = P(AB) = 1, in which case 
there is no correlation between A and B. If each type of experiment is 
performed several times, the frequencies may give us an estimate of 
P(A) and P(B). In order to get an estimate of P(AB), we need to pair 
off particular experiments of each type. For instance, suppose we per- 
formed one experiment of each type each day for a number of days. 
Then P(AB) could be estimated by the proportion of days on which 
both experiments yielded results in the specified range. But if we were 
to conduct this sort of experiment, it would be very surprising if P(AB) 
> P(A)P(B); such a correlation would suggest that Avogadro's num- 
ber was varying from day to day. Therefore, the resemblance among 
experimental results reported by Perrin do not furnish us with the sort 
of probabilistic correlation that permits us to apply the common cause 
principle. This does not mean that Perrin did not provide impressive 
evidence for the existence of a constant number of molecules in one 
mole of a substance-heterogeneity of evidence in support of a hy- 
pothesis has been recognized as a virtue by writers on methodology 
since Whewell-only that his inference cannot be reconstructed using 
Reichenbach's common cause principle. 
3. Genealogical Inference. In this section, I will argue that a certain type 
of inference in historical linguistics assimilates readily to CCP as illus- 
trated in the previous section. First, I will distinguish between three 
different types of question that might be asked about the genealogy of 
a species or language; then I will argue that there is an interesting 
difference between the ways in which evolutionary biology and his- 
torical linguistics attempt to answer one of these types of question. 
3.1. Three Questions. Let A, B, and C be languages or biological 
species. Then we might ask any of the following questions: 
Q1: Do A and B share a common ancestor at all? 
Q2: Given that A, B, and C share some common ancestor, do A 
and B share an ancestor that is not shared with C? 
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Q3: Given that A and B share a common ancestor, what does the 
most recent common ancestor 'look' like? 
The recent literature in the philosophy of biology has focused on ques- 
tions of type Q2, and rightly so, since this type of question has been 
the focus of the most intense debate within the field of systematics itself 
(see Hull 1988 for an engaging presentation of this debate). In this 
context, CCP is subject to well-known limitations. In particular, this 
principle ignores the crucial distinction between correlations among 
derived features of organisms, called apomorphies, and correlations 
among ancestral features, called plesiomorphies. According to the clad- 
istic school, it is only correlations among apomorphies that have pro- 
bative value in addressing questions of type Q2. Note that in order to 
characterize the traits of organisms A, B, and C, as apomorphies or 
plesiomorphies, we must know which of these traits were possessed by 
the common ancestor of A, B, and C; that is, we must have an answer 
to a question of type Q3. As Sober (1988, ?6.5) argues, however, even 
very rudimentary and unreliable methods of answering Q3 suffice for 
providing reliable answers to Q2. 
Note that questions of both types Q2 and Q3 presuppose an answer 
to a question of type Ql. In evolutionary biology, however, questions 
of type Q1 are no longer live questions: all life forms are believed to 
share some common ancestor. One does see Q1 broached, but only in 
responses to spurious creationist challenges, and in the introductory 
chapters of biology textbooks (chapters with titles like "Evidence for 
Evolution"). 
In historical linguistics, all three types of question are actively ad- 
dressed. For example, English belongs to the Indo-European family of 
languages, which includes the Germanic, Romance (Italic), Celtic, 
Slavic, and Indo-Iranian language groups, among others. The pre- 
sumed common ancestor of the Indo-European Languages is referred 
to as Proto-Indo-European. The bulk of research in historical linguistics 
is concerned with the reconstruction of ancestral languages, that is, 
with questions of type Q3. Of course, question Q3 presupposes an af- 
firmative answer to Q1, but it is possible that this presupposition may 
be vindicated or undermined by the success or failure of the reconstruc- 
tion project, rather than established independently. Indeed, many lin- 
guists would claim that it is not possible to establish the common origin 
of two languages without making some headway in attempting to re- 
construct their common ancestor. This is an issue that I will finesse in 
subsequent sections: where linguists talk of languages supplying raw 
material for reconstruction, which in turn provides evidence for com- 
mon ancestry, I will talk directly of languages providing evidence of 
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common ancestry. So long as the features of languages that make re- 
construction possible are not distorted in the process, this simplification 
will have no ill effects. Some linguists (e.g., Ringe 1992) take a similar 
approach. 
Historical linguists also address questions of type Q2. For example, 
among the Indo-European languages, there are standardly recognized 
subfamilies, such as Germanic and Romance, but many open questions 
about the relationships among these subfamilies and among the lan- 
guages within them. In addressing these questions, linguists use similar 
techniques to those employed by biological systematists; in particular, 
shared innovations among languages have a particularly strong eviden- 
tial bearing. Again, in order to distinguish shared innovations from 
shared retentions, one must first be in possession of answers to questions 
of type Q3. At the same time, answers to questions like Q2 are often 
useful in carrying out reconstructions. For example, to reconstruct the 
common ancestor of English and Hindi, i.e., Proto-Indo-European, it is 
helpful to first reconstruct the common ancestor of English and German, 
Proto-Germanic, and the common ancestor of Hindi and Persian, Proto- 
Indo-Iranian, and then attempt a reconstruction of the common ances- 
tor of these reconstructed proto-languages. 
Finally, historical linguists actively address issues of type Q1. For 
example, some linguists have claimed that the Indo-European lan- 
guages belong to a larger family that includes, among others, the Uralic 
languages such as Finnish and Hungarian. Such claims are highly con- 
troversial. Thus linguists are actively concerned with questions such as 
whether English and Finnish are related at all. Note that in addressing 
this sort of question, it is impossible to avail oneself of knowledge of 
shared innovations and shared retentions without begging the question; 
many of the techniques that allow one to answer questions of type Q2 
are not available. The limitations of CCP as a tool for addressing ques- 
tions of type Q2 become limitations for all methods for addressing 
questions of type Q1. Thus it is an open question whether CCP might 
be suitable for addressing these questions. 
In this paper I will be concerned only with questions of type Q1. 
These questions have relatively little intrinsic interest in the biological 
case, where monogenesis is taken for granted; not so in the case of 
historical linguistics. While questions of type Q2 have rightly domi- 
nated the literature in the philosophy of biology, this has obscured 
some of the important distinctions between the methods of systematic 
biology and historical linguistics by focusing attention on the area 
where the methods of the two fields are most closely analogous. By 
focusing attention on Q1 I hope to illustrate some interesting differ- 
432 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.141 on Tue, 8 Apr 2014 14:09:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE COMMON CAUSE PRINCIPLE IN HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS 433 
ences between the two fields that may serve as a springboard for further 
research into the methodology of historical linguistics. 
3.2. Resemblance and Correlation. Human hands and bat wings have 
very similar bone structure. Although the corresponding bones have 
different sizes relative to one another, both structures contain the same 
number of bones, in similar orientations to one another. Such similar- 
ities are commonly taken to be indications of common descent. Anal- 
ogously, we note the English word 'feather' and the German word 
'Feder' are very similar in structure. Both have two syllables, and con- 
tain the same initial and final consonant sounds. (It is the pronuncia- 
tion, rather than the spelling, of words that is of primary interest to 
linguists. Where spelling is a reasonable guide to pronunciation, I will 
not worry about this distinction here.) Correspondences of this sort 
(including correspondences in morphology and syntax as well as pho- 
nology) provide the primary evidence upon which inferences about lin- 
guistic genealogy are made. 
While these inferences look, prima facie, like common cause infer- 
ences, to reconstruct them as such would be premature. While both 
cases clearly involve resemblances in some intuitive sense, we are at 
risk of repeating Salmon's error: we have not shown that these resem- 
blances constitute genuine probabilistic correlations. Consider first the 
case of the structure of the human hand and the bat's wing. Let A 
represent the human hand having the bone structure that it in fact has, 
and B the bat's wing having a similar structure. Can we get a purchase 
on P(A), P(B), and P(AB)? Most humans have hands with the rele- 
vant structure, but a few-due to accidents, congenital conditions, or 
what have you-do not; likewise for bats. So one possibility would be 
to use the frequency of the structure within the human and bat popu- 
lations as an estimate of P(A) and P(B) respectively. If there were a 
natural way of pairing individual humans with individual bats, we 
could use frequency within the population of bat-human pairs to es- 
timate P(AB). But of course there is no such pairing: our inference of 
common descent for bats and humans is not based on these kinds of 
frequencies. 
A second possibility would be to reflect that from an engineering 
perspective, given the function of bat wings and human hands, there 
is no necessity in either having the structure it does-indeed, many 
possible structures can be imagined. Therefore it may seem reasonable 
to assign some fairly low probability to P(A) and P(B). These prob- 
abilities may be thought of intuitively as frequencies over possible 
worlds. I do think that the plethora of conceivable structures for wings 
and hands contributes to our being impressed with this similarity, but 
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it does not help us to construe this resemblance as a probabilistic cor- 
relation. For how are we to gain a purchase on P(AB) to determine if 
it is greater than P(A)P(B)? It is no good to reason that the proba- 
bility P(AB) cannot be all that low, after all, since A and B did both 
occur: some low probability outcome had to occur. Moreover, such a 
priori reflections about alternate possibilities raise difficult questions 
about whether some non-actual creature could have a very different 
wing structure and still be a bat. The problem here is that bats and 
humans have evolved only once, with only the types of wings and hands 
that they in fact have, so we do not have any nontrivial frequencies 
upon which to erect probabilities. 
Here is a further possibility: Bats and humans have enough basic 
morphology in common that it is possible to pair off various of their 
characteristics-they both have eyes, ears, nose, spine, and so on. Al- 
though bats' wings and human hands are quite different, they bear 
sufficiently similar relationships to other structures that they can be 
paired off without appealing to their similar internal structures. Let's 
suppose that we identify 100 human body parts and their bat analogs. 
Of these, four of the bat's parts have the structure in question, and 
four of the human's parts do (assuming we specify the structure loosely 
enough to include feet as well as hands and wings). However, it is the 
corresponding four parts in both bats and humans that have the struc- 
ture in question. That is, P(A) = P(B) = P(AB) = .04. The prob- 
abilities here are based not on frequencies over individuals within taxa 
or over possible worlds, but over body parts. This approach generates 
the needed probabilistic correlation, but there are at least two difficul- 
ties. The first is that it seems to misdescribe what is so striking about 
the example: the correlation in question is that of all the body parts 
that might exhibit the structure in question, it is the parts at the ends 
of limbs in both humans and bats that do. It is surely not this corre- 
lation that catches our eye. More importantly, this correlation would 
exist regardless of the structure of extremities in bats, so long as there 
was some structure such that all and only the extremities of bats had 
that structure. (Recall the variant on Reichenbach's example where the 
leading man passes out.) Yet what is striking about the example is the 
similarity of structure in human hands and bat wings. 
Three observations are in order. First, although the inference that 
humans and bats share a common ancestry cannot be reconstructed as 
the inference from a detected probabilistic correlation to a common 
cause, it in no way follows that the inference is invalid. Second, it may 
be possible to subsume this inference, together with common cause 
inferences such as that described in the previous section, under some 
more general principle. Sober (1988) argues that likelihood may play 
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such a role. Third, systematists do sometimes make inferences based 
upon frequencies not unlike those described in the previous paragraph; 
but they do so in addressing questions of type Q2. Here is a slightly 
modified schema: Suppose species A and B are both known to have 
descended from some common ancestor D. The question under inves- 
tigation is whether they share a common ancestor C more recent than 
D. The characteristics of individuals within the two species may be 
paired off as above. Moreover, for each species, it is determined for 
each character whether that character is inherited directly from D, or 
whether it has been modified through natural selection. If there is a 
correlation among derived characters that is taken as evidence for a 
more recent common ancestor. By taking a plethora of characters and 
reducing them to two basic types, derived and ancestral, it is possible 
to point to frequencies that may bespeak true correlations. Note, how- 
ever, that it is only correlations among derived traits that bespeak re- 
cent common ancestry, so even here the unrestricted CCP does not 
apply. 
In the case of historical linguistics, by contrast, it is much easier to 
point to frequencies that could, in principle, ground claims of proba- 
bilistic correlation. Consider again the case of 'feather' and 'Feder'. 
Among words of English and German, some begin with 'f', while oth- 
ers do not. It is possible, at least in principle, to determine the relative 
frequency with which words of English and German start with this 
consonant sound. These frequencies provide ground for talking of the 
probability that a word of English will start with 'f', and likewise for 
German. (Note that word-initial 'v' in German is usually pronounced 
like the English 'f', so words beginning with this consonant would also 
be included.) Moreover, there is a natural way of pairing up words of 
English and German-by synonymy or inter-translatability, or more 
realistically, similarity of meaning or semantic affinity. Such a system 
of pairing allows us to determine a relative frequency with which cor- 
responding words in the two languages both begin with 'f'. (It is rela- 
tively common: 'father'/'Vater', 'fire'/'Feuer', 'four'/'vier', etc.) Thus we 
have a solid grounding for talk about the probability of the joint oc- 
currence of word-initial 'f' among English-German synonyms. If this 
probability is higher than the product of the probabilities of word- 
initial 'f' in the two languages taken individually, then we have a gen- 
uine probabilistic correlation that can serve as a premise for a common 
cause inference. As we shall see in the next section, linguists do in fact 
rely on these kinds of frequencies in drawing inferences about the his- 
tories of languages. 
Let us spell out the nature of the explanation of the correlation 
between word-initial 'f' in English and German a little more carefully. 
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The excess of English-German word pairs in which both begin with 'f', 
compared to what would be expected by chance, is explained by pos- 
tulating a type of common cause: a word (presumably also beginning 
with 'f') from which given English and German words have both de- 
scended. Some synonymous (or semantically related) word pairs of En- 
glish and German have such a common origin, some do not (either 
because they do not share an ancestor, or they do not share an ancestor 
of the appropriate sort). Moreover, there is a broader framework-an 
ancestral language from which English and German have both de- 
scended--within which this common cause type is sometimes instan- 
tiated. That is, it is because English and German descend from a com- 
mon ancestral language that some synonymous English-German word 
pairs are derived from a common word beginning with 'f'. 
Note that the correlated sounds that indicate common ancestry need 
not be the same. The English consonant 'f' is strongly correlated with 
the consonant 'p' in Romance languages: witness English 'father', 'fish', 
'foot' and Spanish 'padre', 'pescado'/'pez', 'pie'. A case may still be 
made that the sounds 'f' and 'p' resemble one another: both sounds 
result from a stoppage of air flow at the front of the mouth, by the 
upper and lower lips in the case of 'p', and by the upper teeth and lower 
lip in the case of 'f'. But even this level of resemblance is not necessary. 
For example, there is a recognized correlation between the Latin 'du-' 
and Armenian 'erk-', as in 'duo'/'erku' ('two'). For an even more dra- 
matic example, consider Vietnamese, which is a tone language. In Viet- 
namese, whether a syllable is pronounced with rising pitch, descending 
pitch, and so on affects the meaning of that syllable. Haudricourt 
(1953, 1954) established that there is a correlation between the tones 
of Vietnamese, and the consonants of (other) Mon-Khmer languages, 
thus providing evidence for the inclusion of Vietnamese in that lan- 
guage family. In this case the correlations are among sounds that are 
not even in the same phonetic category. 
By the same token, similarities per se are not usually taken to con- 
stitute evidence of common ancestry. This is a point that has been 
unappreciated in the philosophical literature. For example, Sober 
(1993, 42), in talking about the similarity of the French, Italian and 
Spanish names for numbers, writes: "the fact that these languages as- 
sign similar names to numbers is striking evidence [that they are related 
to each other]." Surprisingly, most linguists do not put much stock in 
this sort of evidence. A standard textbook example illustrating the dan- 
gers of relying on similarity involves the Latin and Greek words 'deus' 
and 'theos' (both meaning 'god'). These words are strikingly similar in 
sound and meaning, but do not have a common etymology. This ob- 
servation by itself is not especially telling, since any mode of inference 
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may yield incorrect conclusions on particular occasions. What is im- 
portant about this example is that linguists have a systematic reason 
for rejecting shared etymology in this case: the Latin 'd' and Greek 'th' 
are not correlated sounds. (By contrast, Latin 'd' is strongly correlated 
with Greek 'd', and Latin 'f' with Greek 'th'.) Indeed, those linguists 
who have attempted to base genealogical inferences upon phonetic sim- 
ilarities of words in different languages, most notably Joseph Green- 
berg, have met with strong resistance. In a recent text, Fox (1995) 
writes: 
... instead of presenting correspondence sets for phonological cor- 
respondences, .. . and using these correspondences as a basis for 
linguistic groupings, as discussed above, Greenberg is content to 
look for some evidence of phonetic similarity between forms of 
similar meaning in some of the languages compared .... 
It will be evident that [Greenberg's] method runs counter to the 
principles that we have already examined in earlier chapters of this 
book, and as a result lays itself open to the various erroneous con- 
clusions that those principles were designed to avoid. (238-240.) 
In the case of historical linguistics, then, it is true correlations rather 
than similarities that underwrite inferences of common ancestry. 
Whether linguists are correct in their rejection of inferences based upon 
similarity is another matter, alas one whose examination must await 
another occasion. 
It was noted in the previous section that the inference to a general 
type of common cause from a probabilistic correlation is often more 
reliable than an inference to a particular common cause from one in- 
stance of a correlation: this is certainly true of inferences in historical 
linguistics. For example, there is a correlation between word initial 'b' 
in English and in German ('blood'-'Blut', 'bite'-'biessen', and so on) 
and this is due to some English and German words beginning with 'b' 
evolving from 'b'-initial words in a parent language. It does not follow 
that whenever an English word and its German counterpart both begin 
with 'b' that they share a common etymology: 'belly' and 'Bauch' do not, 
for example. Historical linguists, who are often concerned not only with 
the discovery of relationships between languages, but also in tracing the 
etymology of particular words and reconstructing ancestral languages, 
sometimes fail to recognize that a system of correspondences can serve 
as evidence of linguistic relatedness even if it includes some false cog- 
nates. (This failure is decried by Pinker (1994, 255) for example). 
Inferences about the common origins of languages based upon 
sound correspondences are closely analogous to the common cause 
inference illustrated by Reichenbach's classic example. In order to de- 
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tect a probabilistic correlation of the sort that serves as a premise for 
a common cause inference, it is typically necessary to have a type (or 
many types) that are instantiated by many different individuals in two 
populations, where individuals from the two populations may be read- 
ily paired with one another. In the case of languages, the types are 
sounds, the individuals are words, and the words of different languages 
are paired according to meaning. Biological species do not have this 
type of structure. If the populations consist of individual organisms, 
there is no natural way of pairing organisms across species; if the pop- 
ulations consist of body parts, the relevant types of structures are not 
instantiated by sufficiently many individuals. Thus, in answering ques- 
tions of type Q1, genealogical inferences in historical linguistics con- 
form to CCP in a manner that seemingly analogous inferences in evo- 
lutionary biology do not. 
4. Ringe's Proposal. We commonly make inferences that conform to 
the common cause principle without explicitly estimating the relevant 
probabilities. Even if the actors in the traveling theater troupe did not 
maintain careful records of their health history, they no doubt would 
still have had a qualitative sense that their illnesses were correlated, 
and have been able to infer the existence of a common cause. 
Similarly, in historical linguistics, inferences about the common an- 
cestry of languages are often made without any explicit attempt to 
estimate probabilities. No one familiar with English and German, for 
example, can fail to notice the strong correlations between the sounds 
of the two languages. In a recent textbook, Roger Lass offers the fol- 
lowing summary of the method of historical linguistics: 
1. If two (or more) languages show regular correspondence ...; 
2. and if these correspondences cannot be due to chance because 
of their pervasiveness and apparent systematicity; 
3. and if historical factors and/or the systematicity of the similar- 
ities rules out diffusion; 
4. then the correspondences are due to common origin; or one 
language is the descendant of the other. 
5. If (on independent historical grounds) direct lineal descent is 
not in question, the correspondences are due to common origin. 
(Lass 1997, 124) 
The possibilities described in 3, the second half of 4, and the antecedent 
of 5 correspond to the caveat attached to CCP which allows us to infer 
a common cause of A and B only after we have ruled out the possibility 
of direct causal influence from A to B. Of this, more in Section 5 below. 
For now, note that 2 specifically requires that a given correspondence 
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(such as word-initial 'f' in English and German) occur more often than 
would be expected by chance, exactly as required CCP. Yet in what 
follows, Lass does not once talk about estimating the frequency of 
chance occurrences, or about conducting statistical significance tests. 
Judgments about whether 2 has been satisfied are to be entirely qual- 
itative. This qualitative approach has certainly enjoyed its share of 
success: for example members of the Indo-European language family 
are almost universally regarded as having descended from a common 
source on the basis of primarily qualitative evidence. 
In recent decades, however, there has been a trend toward the pos- 
tulation of ever-broader linguistic families. The basic idea that Indo- 
European may be part of an even larger language family (usually re- 
ferred to as Nostratic) has been around since the turn of the century, 
but has received its most ambitious formulation in the work of the 
Russian linguist Vladislav Illich-Svitych (1971-1984). Illich-Svitych 
proposed a Nostratic family comprising Indo-European along with 
Uralic, Afro-Asiatic (Arabic, Hebrew, and various Northern African 
languages), Altaic (Turkish and Central Asian languages; perhaps also 
Japanese and Korean), Dravidian (Southern Indian languages such as 
Tamil and Telugu), and Kartvelian (languages of the Caucasus Moun- 
tain region). Joseph Greenberg (1987) has proposed that most of the 
diverse native languages of North and South America belong to one 
linguistic family: Amerind (Eskimo and Aleut languages comprise a 
distinct family, as do the Na-Dene languages of Alaska, Northwest 
Canada, and parts of the American Southwest). 
These new super-families of languages have met tremendous resis- 
tance from historical linguists. The debate has often been acerbic, 
fueled in part by the perception that the attention these proposals have 
received in the more popular media (such as The New York Times, 
Scientific American, and Nova) is disproportionate to the amount of 
acceptance they have received among experts in historical linguistics. 
As we have already seen, one objection to Greenberg's proposal is 
that it is based upon similarities, as opposed to correlations. Putting 
this issue aside, a principle difficulty is that the evidence adduced in 
support of these families consists of sound correspondences found 
among hundreds of languages. If these correspondences really bespeak 
common origins, they must exceed in number the correspondences that 
would be expected on the basis of chance alone. When dealing with 
such large numbers of languages, scepticism about our ability to make 
qualitative judgments about probabilistic correlations among them is 
hardly unreasonable. It is a well-known psychological phenomenon 
that humans tend to recognize similarities and ignore differences, to 
the effect that they lose sight of the possibility that the similarities might 
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be coincidental. It seems, then, that there is a need to get at least a 
loose quantitative grip on the correspondences between languages to 
determine whether they constitute genuine correlations. Donald Ringe 
(1995), an influential critic of the new super-families, writes: 
It is not always clear whether the similarities observed between the 
lexica of different languages could easily be the result of random 
chance or must reflect some historical relationship. Particularly dif- 
ficult are cases in which the relationship posited is remote at best; 
such cases must be evaluated by comparison with mathematically 
valid models which realistically simulate chance resemblances be- 
tween languages. (1995, 55) 
Ringe (1992) offers a proposal toward that end (although, unfortu- 
nately, not one that he adheres to in Ringe 1995; see Hitchcock and 
Manaster Ramer, in preparation, for more details). 
Consider any two languages to be compared, say English and Ger- 
man. We compile a canonical one hundred word list for each language 
(called a 'Swadesh' list, after a pioneer of the method). The words are 
chosen so that they are likely to reflect the ancestry of a language. 
(Obviously, if we are searching for signs of a possible common ancestor 
millennia ago, comparing words for 'telephone' will not be of much 
use.) Examples include words for numbers, body parts, relatively ob- 
vious categories of plant and animal, colors, logical operators, and so 
on. Frequencies of, say, initial consonants within this list serve as es- 
timates of probabilities. Thus, for example, five of the English words 
in Ringe's hundred-word list begin with 't'-'two', 'tree', 'tail', 
'tongue', and 'tooth'; so the probability that an English word com- 
mences with 't' is estimated to be .05. Likewise, three of the hundred 
German words begin with 'z' (pronounced 'ts')-- 'zwei' (two), 'Zunge' 
(tongue), 'Zahn' (tooth); so the probability of initial 'z' in German is 
estimated to be .03. Finally, three words begin with 't' in English, and 
with 'z' in German, for a probability of .03. This is much greater than 
the product of the two probabilities, .0015, so we have a probabilistic 
correlation between word initial 't' in English and 'z' in German. Since 
these probabilities are merely estimates based upon frequencies in one 
hundred word lists, Ringe requires that any such correlations be sig- 
nificant at the .01 level; e.g., if the probability for an English word to 
start with 't' and its German counterpart to start with 'z' were .0015, 
there would have to be less than a .01 probability of finding 3 such 
pairs among one hundred word-pairs (as indeed there is) for the cor- 
relation to count. The number of consonant-pairs exhibiting significant 
correlations are then an indication of the relatedness of languages. For 
English and German, it turns out that there are seventeen such pairs, 
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for English and Latin, seven. Likewise, a similar comparison can be 
made for other positions, such as second consonant or final consonant. 
To test the legitimacy of a proposed super-family such as Nostratic or 
Amerind, pairs of languages (or reconstructed proto-languages) com- 
prising that proposed family must be independently tested. Ringe's pro- 
posed test is clearly aimed at detecting the sorts of probabilistic cor- 
relations that call for common cause explanations. 
There are a number of difficulties with this method. Some of these 
involve garden variety concerns over the probability of false negatives 
and false positives. On the one hand, Ringe's requirement that corre- 
lations be significant at the .01 level seems stringent-correlations be- 
tween sounds in distantly related languages might well pass through 
the sieve. On the other hand, in the case of both English and German, 
there were seventeen initial consonants (sixteen consonants plus the 
vowels, which are lumped together as the null-consonant) appearing in 
the one hundred word list, making 289 possible consonant pairings. 
Assuming this number to be typical for pairs of languages, we should 
not be surprised to find a few accidental statistical correlations among 
initial consonants of any two languages. This suggests that Ringe's 
method may not be sensitive enough to adjudicate borderline cases. 
Indeed, Baxter and Manaster Ramer (1996) apply Ringe's test to pairs 
drawn from the following languages: English, Dutch, Welsh, Albanian 
(Indo-European); Hebrew, Hausa (Afro-Asiatic); Turkish (Altaic). 
What they find is that Ringe's test does not discriminate between pairs 
of languages that are currently accepted as distantly related members 
of the same recognized language group, and pairs drawn from different 
families that are unrelated, or at best more distantly related. 
A further problem is that Ringe's test might yield a false negative, 
not merely because of insufficient statistical power, but because the 
related languages do not exhibit the type of correlation being tested 
for. Languages evolve in systematic ways, and may do so in ways that 
erase correlations between consonants. For example, some Australian 
Aboriginal languages, such as Olgolo, have lost all of their initial con- 
sonants. Nonetheless, traces of the consonant remain in the pronun- 
ciation of initial vowels or of consonants occurring later in the word 
(much as the nasalized vowel in the French 'non' is a vestige of the 
final 'n' that was once pronounced). (See Dixon 1980 for a summary 
of some of these findings.) These vestiges allow linguists to determine 
relationships between Olgolo and other Aboriginal languages. Any test 
that sought only correlations between word-initial consonants, how- 
ever, would find none. Recall also the case of Vietnamese, whose tones 
are correlated with the consonants of other Mon-Khmer languages. 
Presumably the consonants of some ancestral language have system- 
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atically evolved into the tones of modern Vietnamese: if this evolution 
is complete, even the most sensitive statistical test would discover no 
correlation between the consonants of Vietnamese and the other Mon- 
Khmer languages. 
None of these difficulties shed doubt on the legitimacy of common 
cause inferences in historical linguistics. We have already noted that 
CCP is formulated in terms of probabilities, not observed statistical 
frequencies. Garden variety problems concerning the inference from 
frequency data to underlying probabilities do not undermine CCP, al- 
though they may cause serious problems for any attempted application 
of CCP. Moreover, CCP does not guarantee that a common cause will 
give rise to a correlation of any particular sort-it tells us nothing 
about what sorts of correlations to look for-it tells us only that if we 
do find a correlation, it is reasonable to postulate a common cause. 
5. Common Cause Caveats. Philosophers discussing CCP, without at- 
tention to its application in historical linguistics, have uncovered a 
number of caveats pertaining to the making of common cause infer- 
ences. In this section I will mention two, and show how these caveats 
correspond to textbook caveats issued to historical linguists. 
First, recall that if A and B are correlated, we are only permitted to 
infer a common cause if we have ruled out the possibility of a direct 
causal connection between A and B. In the case of languages, there are 
two possible ways in which languages can have a direct causal effect 
upon one another. The most obvious possibility is direct descent. We 
have substantial knowledge of Latin, Ancient Greek, and Sanskrit, due 
in part to extensive written records. The sound systems of these lan- 
guages are strongly correlated with the sound systems of French, Mod- 
ern Greek, and Hindi, respectively. In this case, the explanation of the 
correlations would not be descent from a common ancestor, but direct 
descent of French from Latin, Modern from Ancient Greek, and Hindi 
from Sanskrit. 
A second possibility for the direct causal influence of one language 
on another is borrowing (or diffusion). The English word 'karaoke' is 
very similar in pronunciation to a Japanese word with the same mean- 
ing. But this is no indication of a common origin of the English and 
Japanese languages: rather the English word is taken directly from the 
Japanese. Moreover, while the English word 'karaoke' and the Spanish 
word 'karaoke' have a common cause, that common cause does not lie 
in the common origin of the two languages, but only in the Japanese 
language from which both English and Spanish borrowed the word. 
Isolated loan words will not give rise to systematic correlations between 
the sounds of two languages, but in some cases borrowing from one 
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language into another is extensive. English has borrowed extensively 
from Latin and French, for example. We noted above a correlation 
between English 'f' and Romance 'p', illustrated by 'father'-'padre', 
'fish'-'pez' and 'foot'-'pie'. But we might also find a 'p'/'p' correlation, 
illustrated by English words such as 'paternal', 'piscine', and 'pedes- 
trian'. If taken at face value, this correlation might lead us to postulate 
a more recent common ancestry for English and the Romance lan- 
guages than actually exists. Vietnamese has borrowed so many words 
from Chinese that the former's relationship with the Mon-Khmer lan- 
guages (which do not include Chinese) had been obscured until rela- 
tively recently. 
At this point, we must be careful not to take the analogy between 
linguistic relationships and family trees too far. I do not mean to sug- 
gest that descent with modification is the only true source of linguistic 
relatedness, and that borrowing merely serves to obscure such rela- 
tionships. Rather, borrowing is a distinct mechanism wherein one lan- 
guage can be related to another. The moral of the present caveat is 
that the two mechanisms must be clearly distinguished if genealogical 
relationships between languages are to be understood. Particularly 
problematic in this regard are creole languages, such as those spoken 
in Jamaica, Haiti, and Sierra Leone. Creole languages are true hybrids, 
and thus their lexica are not obviously classifiable as having been bor- 
rowed rather than inherited or vice versa. (Similar problems involving 
migration and hybridization can arise in evolutionary biology as well, 
although here the barriers to such 'horizontal' transmission of infor- 
mation are stronger.) 
The second general caveat concerning common cause inferences is 
that we must distinguish between two different kinds of common cause. 
This point is made clearly by Salmon (1984, Ch. 6), who uses the terms 
'conjunctive' and 'interactive' to distinguish them. Salmon claims that 
these two types of common cause are characterized by different prob- 
ability relations. This claim has been contentious, but I will not address 
it here. Interactive common causes involve direct physical interactions 
between systems; conjunctive common causes involve systems that are 
exposed to similar environments. Reichenbach's example of the trav- 
eling theater troupe is of the second sort: the leading man and leading 
lady do not become ill because they directly interact with one another, 
but because they are exposed to the same environmental hazard, 
tainted food. As an example of the first sort of common cause, Salmon 
asks us to imagine a billiard table containing only the cue ball and the 
eight ball in a particular configuration. This configuration is such that 
if the cue ball strikes the eight ball in such a way that the latter will go 
into the corner pocket, then the cue ball will also go into a corner 
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pocket. If we imagine an imperfect pool player making many attempts 
to sink the eight ball in this configuration, the eight ball will sometimes 
go in, sometimes not; however, whenever the eight ball goes in, the cue 
ball does as well, so there is a strong correlation between the sinking 
of the two balls, explained in terms of the occasional direct physical 
interaction between them. Note that the observations that were made 
upon Reichenbach's example of the traveling theater troupe in Section 
2 carry over readily to the billiard ball example, so those observations 
are not specific to one type of common cause or the other. 
This dichotomy does not map perfectly onto the domain of historical 
inference in linguistics, but it does correspond at least roughly to a 
linguistically significant distinction. In the case of historical linguistics, 
we are interested in whether the genealogies of two languages actually 
overlap. This suggests that we are looking for interactive common 
causes. We must be wary, then, of the possibility that correlations be- 
tween languages are brought about by conjunctive common causes; 
that is, we must be wary of correspondences between languages that 
arise when the sounds of words are shaped by similar types of pro- 
cesses. A word similar in pronunciation and meaning to the English 
'mama' appears in Mandarin Chinese. A plausible explanation is that 
in both languages, sounds made by infants have become associated 
with the family members (such as mothers) that are in their presence 
when the sounds are made. Since 'mama' is among the simplest sounds 
for infants to make, this is the sound that has become associated with 
mothers in both languages. Such words are called nursery words. If this 
explanation is correct, the similarity between the Mandarin and En- 
glish words would be due not to the common origin of the languages 
in question, but rather to the similar circumstances in which the words 
enter the language. 
Much the same may be true of onomatopoetic words. Several lan- 
guages contain words similar in both sound and meaning to the English 
word 'cock-a-doodle-do' (such as the Russian 'kukuriku'); that need 
not be due to the common origins of the languages in question, but is 
likely because those languages also have words that resemble the 
sounds they denote. For another example, consider the English word 
'babble', meaning to speak incomprehensibly; Aztec contains the verb 
popolo-ca, 'to speak a foreign language', but this similarity may well 
be due to onomatopoeia. 
While onomatopoeia and nursery words are standard fare in lin- 
guistics textbooks, they pose a much greater risk to the enterprise of 
constructing etymologies of particular words than they do to the en- 
terprise of uncovering historical relationships between languages. In 
general, the overall impact on the correlation of sounds between lan- 
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guages that can be expected due to onomatopoeia and nursery words 
is minuscule, and unlikely to obscure the true relationship (or lack 
thereof) between languages. 
6. Directions for Future Research. I do not pretend to have done more 
than scratch the surface: to characterize one sort of inference in his- 
torical linguistics as conforming to CCP is to provide only the loosest 
sort of characterization of one part of the field; many problems of 
philosophical interest remain. Here are a few: 
(i) I have taken the legitimacy of common cause inferences in the 
linguistic domain more or less for granted. As Sober (1988) has force- 
fully argued, however, individual methods of non-deductive inference 
cannot be globally justified, but only justified relative to domain- 
specific empirical assumptions. In this case, common cause inferences 
must be justified by assumptions about the processes of language 
change. The standard assumption underlying most work in historical 
linguistics is that sound change takes place in a lawlike manner within 
individual languages; like sounds evolve into like sounds. What does 
this assumption, suitably formulated, actually entail about the success 
of common cause inference? Is the common cause principle incompat- 
ible with competing accounts of language change, such as the wave 
model, wherein linguistic innovations have an 'epicenter' within a par- 
ticular language but then disseminate into other languages, largely on 
the basis of geographical proximity? 
(ii) As mentioned above, historical linguists are typically concerned 
primarily with the reconstruction of ancestral languages, that is, with 
answering questions of type Q3. Is philosophy of science able to shed 
any light on the methods employed in reconstruction? Since reconstruc- 
tion is based upon sound correspondence in much the way described 
above, can the methods of reconstruction be characterized in terms of 
CCP? One obvious problem is that CCP, as formulated in Section 2 
above, may allow us to infer that there is a common cause, but it does 
not allow us to infer what form that cause takes. The latter would seem 
to be essential for reconstruction-unless we conceive of the recon- 
structed forms as abstracta, as some linguists think we ought. 
(iii) Are the arguments against the cogency of inferences based upon 
resemblance themselves cogent? This is a central issue in the contro- 
versy over Greenberg's proposed Amerind language family. Argu- 
ments offered by linguists often appeal to broadly probabilistic consid- 
erations, but are rarely made probabilistically rigorous. 
(iv) The sorts of mathematical models described in Section 4 were 
oversimplified-they measured only correlations among initial conso- 
nants of synonymous words in two languages. The preponderance of 
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evidence for genuine historical relationships, however, comprises cor- 
respondences among sounds that occur in slightly different positions 
in words of related but not identical meaning in several languages. Are 
realistic probabilistic models of such looser correspondences possible? 
Ringe (1995) purports to make a step in this direction, but his argument 
is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding. Ringe argues that 
since the distribution of alleged cognates in the six subfamilies ofNos- 
tratic is binomial, the putative cognate sets might well reflect chance 
resemblances among languages. But so long as the six subfamilies 
evolved independently after having diverged from a common ancestor, 
so that vocabulary loss was independent and identically distributed, 
one would equally expect a binomial distribution of cognates (see 
Hitchcock and Manaster Ramer, in preparation, for more details). In 
this case, the lack of a concrete and plausible model for the evolution 
of several language families led one prominent linguist astray. 
(v) The mathematical models proposed by linguists are typically for- 
mulated in the idiom of classical statistics. Given that strong evidence 
for linguistic relationships can be supplied by historical, archeological, 
cultural, textual and even genetic sources, would it not be more appro- 
priate to examine linguistic inferences from a Bayesian perspective, 
where prior probabilities can reflect the evidence conferred upon cer- 
tain hypotheses from non-linguistic sources? 
While some of these issues have been addressed by historical lin- 
guists themselves, discussions often lack the philosophical sensitivity 
that such issues deserve. It is my hope that this state of affairs will 
change. 
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